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Abstract
We present a simple and secure system for encrypting and decrypting information using DNA self-assembly. Binary data is
encoded in the geometry of DNA nanostructures with two distinct conformations. Removing or leaving out a single
component reduces these structures to an encrypted solution of ssDNA, whereas adding back this missing ‘‘decryption key’’
causes the spontaneous formation of the message through self-assembly, enabling rapid read out via gel electrophoresis.
Applications include authentication, secure messaging, and barcoding.
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Introduction
As the blueprint for all living things, DNA has a remarkable
ability to robustly store and relay information. Two salient features
of DNA make this possible: its modular construction from four
distinct bases (A, C, G, T) whose sequence determines the genetic
code, and the specific base pairing between complementary bases
that enables hybridization into a double-stranded complex. These
features of DNA have been exploited to perform computations
and process information [1–6], including the hiding and encryp-
tion of secret messages [7–10]. Not only has DNA formed a
foundation for the field of biomolecular computing, but the
robustness of DNA-base pairing has also led to its use as a
programmable structural material to construct objects with nanoscale
features [11]. Recently, the accessibility and versatility of DNA
nanotechnology has been remarkably increased with an approach
referred to as DNA origami [12]. With a carefully designed
collection of oligonucleotides, DNA can self-assemble into 2D and
3D shapes of stunning complexity [12–14], some of which
incorporate sensing and actuation [15,16]. Combining the
concepts of DNA as an information processing molecule and as
a structural material, we have developed a simple and powerful
approach for encoding and encrypting information.
In previous work, we used DNA origami methods to construct a
nanoscale mechanical switch [17], which we used to study the
force-dependence of molecular interactions at the single-molecule
level. This switch could be in one of two states, looped or
unlooped, and we observed that these conformational differences
were clearly resolvable in an agarose gel (Figure 1a). Thus, while
other schemes for representing binary data using DNA have been
presented [8,18,19], here we focus on using the geometric
conformation of DNA nanostructures to encode binary values,
due to the ease of both encoding and decoding information using
this approach. We have made three distinct realizations of this
concept, as demonstrated in Figure 1. These nanoscale structures
can switch between two distinct states, acting as a ‘‘mechanical
bit’’ to enable the storage and processing of information
(analogous to mechanical relays in the earliest digital computers).
These mechanical bits can be prepared in either state (0 or 1), and
transitions between these states could be controlled using chemical
or physical means (e.g. by changing the presence or absence of a
critical molecular component, by varying the temperature, by
interactions with light [20], or by applying mechanical force
[17,21]). Importantly, the state of these bits can be read out in
minutes using gel electrophoresis, or faster using single-molecule
imaging and manipulation techniques, and multiple bits can be
represented with different lengths of DNA to facilitate multiplexed
information processing and readout.
Each mechanical bit is formed via DNA self-assembly, and can
be encrypted by omitting a critical component of its structure (e.g.
a key single-stranded DNA molecule) that reduces it to an
unstructured mixture of oligonucleotides. Messages encrypted as a
collection of such bits are difficult to decipher since the 0 bits and 1
bits are nearly indistinguishable mixtures of oligonucleotides that
are identical in all but sequence. On the other hand, decryption
with a key is very easy–simply adding the missing component
triggers the self-assembly of these nanoscale mechanical bits into
their unencrypted forms. The separation of each mechanical bit
into two parts or two ‘‘keys’’ forms an asymmetric encryption
system. This system has the ‘‘public key’’ property if the key is
distributed physically, since one key cannot be readily determined
from the other without knowledge of the sequence. Furthermore,
suitable countermeasures, such as adding ‘‘distractor’’ oligos to the
physical encryption key to obscure information, can make the
decryption sequence difficult to obtain.
As an example, let us consider how Alice could send an
encrypted message to Bob (Figure 2) using the linear binary switch
shown in Figure 1C. Suppose she would like to send a three bit
message, such as ‘‘101’’. First, Bob must generate the appropriate
DNA encryption and decryption keys for each bit. To distinguish
between bits, he chooses each to be a different DNA length, (e.g 20
bases, 30 bases and 40 bases), and then generates 3 equal length
oligos for each bit (A, A’, and B), two of which are complementary
and hybridize together (A and A’) and one of which is inert (B) (see
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makes vials of A and B for each bit available, which represent the 1
and 0 values, respectively, while keeping the vials of oligo A’
private. Together, the vials of A and B oligos form the encryption key,
which can be used by anyone to encrypt a message. To send a
message to Bob, Alice would mix either A (for a 1) or B (for a 0) for
each bit into a single vial and send this mixture to Bob over a
public channel. At this point, only Bob can decrypt the message by
mixing in the private decryption key (the set of A’ oligos) and running
a gel–even Alice has no way to decrypt her own message once it’s
been made.
Results and Discussion
We experimentally demonstrated this encryption scheme for an
8-bit encoding by using 8 different lengths of DNA strands to
represent the individual bits. We encoded a plaintext message
using an 8-bit binary ASCII encoding with the 8th bit as an even
parity bit, and encrypted the message into an ordered sequence of
DNA mixtures, one for each letter. These mixtures were then
decrypted by mixing them with the private key oligos and read out
by immediately running an agarose gel. Reading each gel lane
from top to bottom, the decrypted message ‘‘Hello world’’
becomes unambiguously clear (Figure 3).
One of the most intriguing aspects of encrypting messages with
DNA as described is the difficulty for an interceptor or attacker to
decrypt it. At a minimum, decryption attempts require possession
of the physical message as well as technical skill, laboratory
equipment, and time. Since the message is encrypted physically,
the transmission of data can be well controlled, and even copying
the encrypted message poses a significant technical challenge.
Unlike encryption schemes that rely on mathematical algorithms,
our biochemical based encryption is not directly vulnerable to
increasing computational power. With physical decryption, the
number of decryption attempts is limited by the availability of
physical material comprising the message, which is depleted with
each attempt. In fact, the message could theoretically be reduced
to enable only a single decryption attempt.
Attempts to crack the message without the decryption key would
be difficult, especially for an attacker limited to the same resources
as the intended recipient (i.e. electrophoresis and mixing
equipment). For example, a na ¨ive brute force attack to find the
decryption key would require the physical generation and testing
of an astronomical number of possible keys, with 4
N distinct
possibilities, or 10
155 for our simple 8-bit encoding scheme (and an
approximately 1 in 10
63 chance of guessing a decryption key if we
allow for 25% mismatched bases [8,22]). However, aside from the
correct decryption key, there could also exist a pseudo key or set of
pseudo keys that could allow an attacker to distinguish between
individual mixtures, providing a toehold for unauthorized
decryption using language statistics on a large set of messages.
Additionally, if the attacker has access to more sophisticated
approaches, including sequencing techniques, DNA profiling with
microarrays, or the ability to make libraries of oligos to test
multiple keys at a time, then the security will be reduced.
Fortunately, many of these approaches can be impeded by
implementing the appropriate countermeasures, as described
below. In addition, it is interesting to note that many of the
potential ways to crack the code may involve significant technical
Figure 1. DNA as a binary switch. The conformations of two-state DNA nanostructures can represent bits through open or closed states,
representing 0 and 1 respectively. We demonstrate this concept with three different implementations: a) a self-assembled construct with an
addressable loop closure as described previously [17], b) a switchable circular/linear construct, and c) a double-stranded/single-stranded segment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044212.g001
Figure 2. Conceptualization of DNA encryption and decryption. Alice prepares her message by mixing together oligos that correspond to
either a binary 0 or 1 for each bit. This mixture is sent to Bob through a public channel, who decrypts the message by adding the DNA decryption key.
This causes the message to self-assemble, enabling rapid read out by gel electrophoresis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044212.g002
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processes, giving rise to a large asymmetry in effort compared to
encrypting and decrypting the message with the proper keys.
To maximize encryption security, a variety of countermeasures
can be used that comprise a two pronged approach: 1) limiting
access to physical information about the message (e.g. the oligo
sequences), and 2) making this physical information difficult to
decipher. One simple countermeasure is to limit the physical
amount of material comprising the message, as mentioned above.
Additionally, we can impede chemical analysis by modifying the
ends of the oligos to prevent the chemical conjugation required for
some sequencing and profiling techniques. One important
countermeasure against unauthorized decryption that falls into
both categories is the addition of noise by mixing ‘‘distractor
strands’’ into the physical message (described in detail elsewhere
[8,23]). Adding oligonucleotides with a similar length and
composition as the message strands but with different sequences
increases the time and effort required to obtain the sequences of
the oligonucleotides within the encrypted mixture, which is
already a challenge due to their short lengths [24–26]. Also,
distractor strands make deciphering the message more difficult
since the true message can be obscured by noise designed to like
the signal, or vice versa [23]. For a public key system, special care
should be taken in designing the distractor strands to ensure that
the two values for each bit are difficult to distinguish using a
pseudo key or other biochemical techniques (e.g. mass spectrom-
etry). For a private key system, distractor strands can be very
effective at deterring statistical analysis, as each occurrence of a
given letter could be mixed with a different set of distractor
strands. In fact, false messages could be encoded into the mixture
with distractor strands that represent ‘‘false encryption keys’’, and
the attacker would have little way to identify the true message
without knowing the specific decryption key sequence. Alterna-
tively, to make the signal look more like the noise, DNA structures
could be pre-encrypted with standard computer encryption
algorithms. Furthermore, cracking the code becomes increasingly
challenging the more distractor strands are added, and the more
bits per message are encoded.
While our demonstration showed 1 byte (8 bits) of data storage
per mixture (and per gel lane), the amount of data stored and read
out could be readily increased. If DNA lengths were optimized to
be evenly spaced on the gel, a resolution of 1 mm would give 10
bits/cm of gel length, corresponding to roughly 8 bytes of data for
a single short gel lane, 10–20 bytes for longer gels, and up to 125
bytes (,1000 bits) for more elaborate sequencing gels with base
pair resolution [27]. Expanding to a few bytes could enable the
transmission of entire words or short messages in a single mixture,
especially if a more efficient character encoding scheme were used
(e.g. the 5 bit Baudot code), or a word-based encoding scheme (e.g.
10 bytes could encode eight words of a 1000 word vocabulary). In
addition, data density could be dramatically increased by
combining multiple messages within a single mixture, with each
message associated with a different decryption key. We note that
these approaches will improve security by making statistical
analysis of the message difficult.
In summary, we have developed a novel technique for encoding
binary information in two-state DNA nanostructures, for encrypt-
ing and decrypting this information using self-assembly, and for
rapidly reading this information back out with gel electrophoresis.
As the state of such nanostructures can be used to report molecular
events (such as the rupture of intermolecular bonds [17]),
additional applications of this work beyond information security
include the characterization of molecular interactions with a
multiplexed gel readout. More directly, this approach provides a
relatively simple and inexpensive way to send secure, and
potentially hidden, messages over a public channel. Unlike similar
DNA encryption methods that require specialized laboratory work
(e.g. PCR, sequencing, cloning) that can take hours to days [7–10],
Figure 3. Decoding a binary message on a gel. Each lane of the gel contains a mixture of oligonucleotides which together form an 11 byte
binary ASCII message which reads ‘‘Hello world’’. The bit strings are read from top to bottom with the most significant bit being the largest DNA
segment. Presence of a band indicates a binary 1, while absence of a band indicates a binary 0. All lanes have the same amount of DNA present, but
only the double stranded pieces dye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044212.g003
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minutes, requiring as little as disposable droppers and a no-prep
bufferless (even handheld) gel system (e.g. Invitrogen E-gel
systems). This convenience and simplicity also opens the technol-
ogy to other applications such as authentication and barcoding.
For example, increasing storage capacity to 40 bits would enable
storage of the ubiquitous 12 digit Universal Product Code (UPC).
Several methods have been demonstrated for storing printed DNA
on paper [28,29], which combined with our quick readout method
could enable a new level of security in product identification. In
fact, tagging with DNA inks has recently found commercial use
(DNA Technologies, Halifax, Canada) in anti-counterfeiting
efforts for a variety of products including sports memorabilia,
artwork, pharmaceuticals, and luxury goods. As previously
proposed, DNA barcodes may also find use in labeling of liquids
such as paint and oil, or possibly even food [8]. As another
example, it could provide a simple and inexpensive way for
pharmaceutical companies to discretely label drugs with produc-
tion or expiration information, even at the level of edible
encrypted barcodes on individual tablets. This is particularly
timely in light of recently introduced government mandates (e.g.
California E-Pedigree Law) to serialize pharmaceuticals and to
ultimately ‘‘track and trace’’ them, since our method offers a way
to identify and authenticate drugs, reducing theft and counterfeit-
ing. One could also envision personal identification cards (e.g.
driver’s license, passports) being printed with DNA markers on
them as an additional prevention against fraud or identity theft, or
even using one’s own genomic DNA as an authentication key.
Materials and Methods
We designed and purchased oligos (Bioneer, Inc.) to represent 8
different bits, which would be about evenly spaced on a 4%
agarose gel. The lengths we chose were 20 nt, 22 nt, 25 nt, 28 nt,
32 nt, 37 nt, 43 nt, and 50 nt. For each length, 3 oligos were
purchased: a randomly generated sequence, it’s complementary
strand, and a random set with arbitrary bases. We denote these as
set A, A’, and B respectively.
To encode messages, we first converted our plain text message
‘‘Hello world’’ into binary code using 8 bit ASCII character
encoding with the 8th bit as an even parity bit for error checking.
Since we have 8 bits total, each letter was prepared using a
mixture of A and B oligos to represent the 0 s and 1 s. As an
example, the ‘‘H’’ in ‘‘Hello world’’ has an 8 bit binary
representation of 01001000. The least significant bit is encoded
in the smallest (20 nt) oligo, which we will denote oligo 1. To
encode the ‘‘H’’, we mix oligos 4 and 7 from set A with oligos 1, 2,
3, 5, 6, and 8 from set B.
For decoding, the encoded message mixtures were individually
mixed with the entire set A’ of oligos in a buffer solution (16Buffer
4, New England Biolabs) and loaded into a gel (within minutes).
We ran an automated precast 4% agarose gel (E-gel, Invitrogen)
containing a proprietary dye (with characteristics remarkably
similar to Sybr gold) for 15 minutes and took a picture
immediately after. The binary representation of each gel lane
could be read directly from top to bottom.
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